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Abstract. This paper presents an overview of the current state-of-the-art of se-
curity and privacy concerns regarding RFID-based car key applications. We 
will first present a general overview of the technology and its evolution before 
moving on to an overview and discussion of the various known security weak-
nesses and attacks against such systems and the associated privacy risks they in-
troduce. 
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1 Introduction 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology [1] has been around since 1973 in 
its modern form (with earlier incarnations going back all the way to Soviet espionage 
technology in 1945) but has only relatively recently been adopted on a mass-scale as 
the result of the convergence of low cost and increased sophistication. Security-
oriented applications are myriad and include RFID-enabled car keys [2]. This paper 
will provide an overview of the security and privacy aspects of RFID-technology 
applied to car keys and the current state-of-the-art in these fields. With the introduc-
tion of Near-Field Communication (NFC) technology, which builds upon RFID, vari-
ous proposals for smartphone-based NFC car keys have surfaced as well [3] but re-
main outside of the scope of this paper. 
 
Car keys have multiple uses, from opening car doors, glove compartments and the 
trunk to starting the ignition. Traditional car keys are mechanical in nature and as 
such are vulnerable to the usual security risks: theft, key duplication, lock picking, etc 
[4]. In addition, cars can be hot-wired [5], a process which involves bypassing the 
car’s ignition interlock in order to start the car without access to a key. RFID-
technology has both sought to combat such traditional security issues as well as intro-
duced new ones. 
 
With user-convenience in mind, so-called remote keyless systems (RKS) [6] were 
first introduced for automobiles with the Renault Fuego in 1982 [7]. RKS refers to 
any lock that uses an electronic remote control as a key. Most RKS work through use 
of short-range radio transmissions, usually within a effective area of 5-20 meters. The 
functionality of RKS are usually present on a so-called key fob [8] and can be activat-
  
ed when within the vicinity of the corresponding vehicle, the so-called “bubble”, ei-
ther by manually pressing the corresponding lock/unlock or automatically when pull-
ing the door handle (in the case of so-called ‘passive entry’ systems). RKS includes 
both remote keyless entry systems (RKE), which refers to the functionality control-
ling the locking and unlocking of vehicle doors, as well as remote keyless ignition 
systems (RKI), which refers to starting the engine. 
 
However, early RKS were not designed as an anti-theft measure but as a convenience 
measure [9], often implemented no security measures and did not mitigate problems 
such as lock picking or hot-wiring.  In order to combat such security risks, ignition 
immobilizers [10] were developed. Almost all cars manufactured since 1995 have 
been outfitted with RFID transponder-enabled immobilizers [11] which have been 
mandatory in several countries since at least 1998 as well as all European insurance 
companies requiring them. Immobilizers are electronic security devices that prevent 
the vehicle engine from running unless the corresponding token is present. The setup 
works by having an RFID transponder present in the key fob of the car key (with later 
systems dropping the mechanical part of the key altogether) and an RFID transceiver 
(typically located close to the mechanical key lock in the steering column) connected 
to the vehicle’s engine control unit (ECU) [12]. The transponder usually contains an 
EEPROM for storing additional configuration or secret data. Upon insertion of the 
ignition key in the ignition lock cylinder, the ECU will activate the transceiver to send 
a signal to activate the transponder (followed by a command). The transponder will 
responded with its coded message which the ECU will verify. Transponders are often 
passive but can be active as well, possessing an internal battery and behaving similar 
to passive devices except for increased performance and utilizing the battery to gener-
ate often more computationally complex response data [13]. In both cases, activation 
is mostly triggered by the transceiver signal. Upon authentication, the ECU will allow 
ignition to take place and fuel to flow. In the absence of such authentication (whether 
due the wrong key or no key being present at all), the engine will not start. In some 
modern vehicles, unauthorized starting attempts will initialize lock-outs, communi-
cate an alert to a security firm by satellite or mobile phone or record information in 
the ECU related to speed, driver weight, geographic location, etc. for use by insurance 
investigations or warranty claims [10]. Many manufacturers have been moving away 
from mechanical keys altogether [14] in favor of fully electronic “smart keys” which 
incorporate all RKS functionality (including immobilizer disengagement) without the 
user having to insert a mechanical key in the ignition lock, provided they start ignition 
when inside the car. In initial implementations, RKE and immobilizer functionality 
was totally separated [9] but today both functions are combined in a single IC using a 
low frequency ferrite coil antenna for the transponder function and an UHF transmit-
ter for the RKE function. In such scenarios, immobilizers are left as the only anti-theft 
mechanism. 
  
2 Security 
RFID-based car key systems have often been popularly portrayed as ‘uncrackable’ 
and are credited with a major reduction in car theft since their widespread adoption in 
the ‘90s [15,16]. However, in recent years a number of successful attacks have been 
developed against various RKE and immobilizer security schemes, which has led to 
some media attention [17,18,19,20] regarding the (in)security of RFID car key sys-
tems. In addition, there have been reports of criminals exploiting weaknesses in such 
systems [21,22,23], either in order to facilitate car theft or to obtain valuables locked 
inside the car. The security of RFID-based car key systems can roughly be divided in 
two aspects: (a) Remote Keyless Entry systems (b) Immobilizers. Sometimes, due to 
design restrictions, both systems will have shared security mechanisms and often 
there will be some overlap between utilized protocols and cryptographic algorithms. 
2.1 RKE systems 
As [24] shows there are several approaches to message transmission between vehicle 
and key fob, with varying levels of security: 
1. Fixed code: Initially, RKE systems relied on fixed codes where a predetermined 
code is stored in the fob. Upon user activity, the fob transmits this fixed code and 
when the associated vehicle is within range it checks whether the code is valid. If 
this is the case, the associated predefined operation is performed. 
 
2. Rolling code: This technique, also known as ‘hopping code’, utilizes a different 
code for each transmission and has been widely used in RKE systems. Rolling 
code systems maintain a sequence counter containing the code to be transmitted 
upon next activation of the fob. The transmitted sequence counter is usually en-
crypted (where key fob and vehicle share a secret key) using a block cipher, with 
KeeLoq being one of the most widespread ciphers used in this capacity [25]. After 
transmission, the sequence counter content is incremented. The vehicle also main-
tains a sequence counter. Upon reception of the fob’s signal the receiver decrypts 
the sender’s signal to obtain its sequence counter, which it then compares against 
its own sequence counter. The sender’s message is validated and the operation is 
performed when the difference between the two sequence counters lies within a 
certain range. After receiving a valid code, the receiver also increments its se-
quence counter. 
 
3. Challenge-Response: Authentication based on challenge-response schemes is 
widely used in immobilizer systems [14,26,27] but has found adoption in some 
RKE systems as well [28]. In a challenge-response scheme a bidirectional commu-
nication link is used and both the key fob and the vehicle share a secret encryption 
key. Upon activation (when the user pulls one of the door handles of the vehicle in 
a passive RKE scenario, for example) the vehicle sends a random number (the 
challenge) to the key fob. The key fob then encrypts the challenge using their 
  
shared encryption key and sends this response to the vehicle. The vehicle then veri-
fies whether its encrypted challenge matches the response from the vehicle and 
when both match, the required operation is performed. 
There are a number of attack scenarios possible [24] against the RKE approaches 
mentioned above. Many of the described attack scenarios introduce additional prob-
lems for victims regarding legal and insurance matters, as most of them leave little or 
no traces and proving actual theft has occurred (rather than fraud) is very hard. 
1. Brute-force attack: Depending on the key size, RKE systems could be susceptible 
to straightforward brute-force attacks. In the case of a fixed code scheme an ex-
haustive search of the key space could be performed provided the key size is suf-
ficiently small. In the case of a challenge-response scheme, a specific type of 
brute-force attack could be performed (known as a scanning attack) where upon 
every challenge, the same constant response is returned until a match occurs. 
Generally speaking, any authentication system with a big enough key space (or set 
of challenge-response pairs) should make brute-force attacks infeasible [29]. 
 
2. Replay attack: A replay attack, also known as a ‘code-grabbing attack’, involves 
an attacker intercepting the transmitted message from the target’s key fob to the 
vehicle and storing it for later usage. In the case of a fixed code scheme, the at-
tacker could easily re-transmit the captured message to automatically gain access 
to the vehicle since the message doesn’t change each time the system is used. 
Rolling code schemes were developed to mitigate this kind of attack and, when 
properly implemented, provide adequate defense against replay attacks, as do 
challenge-response schemes. Since the sequence counter increments upon each 
successful action (in the case of a rolling code) and a new challenge is used for 
each authentication attempt (in the case of a challenge-response), simply captur-
ing a valid message and retransmitting it later will no longer work. However, it is 
possible to successfully combine replay attacks with jamming attacks against 
some systems, as discussed below. 
 
3. Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack: A MITM-attack [24, 29, 30], also known as a 
‘two-thief attack’, involves an attacker setting up an electronic ‘bridge’ between 
the target vehicle and the key fob. The attacker pulls a door handle of the vehicle 
(note that this assumes a scenario with passive RKE support) which initiates the 
transmission of a message which is captured by the attacker and sent to the other 
side of the ‘bridge’, which sends the message to the key fob. The key fob’s re-
sponse to this message is captured and sent back to the attacker near the vehicle, 
who then transmits it to the vehicle granting them access. Such a scenario is easi-
est performed with two attackers, but it isn’t inconceivable passive equipment 
might be installed near a location the target frequents allowing for a single attack-
er scenario. Both rolling code and challenge response schemes are susceptible to 
MITM attacks. In addition, once an attacker has gained access to the vehicle by 
performing a relay attack on the RKE system, a subsequent relay attack could be 
performed against the key to disarm the ignition immobilizer (especially in the 
  
case of ‘smart keys’), allowing the attacker to start the car and drive away. Since 
it would be very unsafe to turn off the engine on a running car once the key is ab-
sent, the relay doesn’t have to be maintained (though some vehicles reportedly 
limit speed or send out a beeping signal in such a case [30]). 
 
In order to mitigate against a MITM attack, several measures could be taken. A 
fairly simple one would involve shielding the key from RF signals while it isn’t in 
use and commercial solutions for this type of protection are already available [31]. 
A more thorough form of protection, however, would involve a distance bounding 
scheme (taking into account the various attacks against such a scheme, like mafia- 
or terrorist fraud) which establishes a maximum upper bound on the physical dis-
tance between the vehicle and the key fob [32]. 
 
4. Forward-prediction attack: This type of attack involves the attacker attempting to 
predict a subsequent challenge by observing a set of previous challenges which 
can be obtained either by pulling the door handle several times (in the case of a 
passive system) or through observing a target entering and exiting their car a few 
times. If an attacker is capable of predicting such a subsequent challenge (because 
of an insecure Pseudo-Random Number Generator, for example), they can send 
out this challenge to the target’s key fob while they’re away from the vehicle, rec-
ord the response and use it to open the vehicle. Rolling code schemes aren’t vul-
nerable to such an attack since (assuming messages are encrypted and the key re-
mains secret) it is impossible for an attacker to know what sequence counter an 
encrypted message corresponds to and as such even the ability to predict the sub-
sequent counter wouldn’t work. 
 
In order to mitigate forward-prediction attacks, any challenge-response scheme 
should rely on a Cryptographically-Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator 
(CSPRNG) for the generation of its challenges. In addition, the system should be 
designed such that challenge generation would halt for a fixed period of time if no 
valid responses have been received for a certain number of the previous challeng-
es, thus decreasing the number of challenges generated per unit time and compli-
cating an attacker’s efforts further. 
 
5. Dictionary attack: A dictionary attack involves an attacker building an electronic 
dictionary consisting of valid challenge-response keypairs. This is done by gener-
ating a random challenge while in this proximity of the key fob, transmitting it 
and collecting the response. Since there is no sender verification by the key fob, it 
will automatically respond. After building a sufficiently large dictionary, the at-
tacker could go to the vehicle and keep re-initiating authentication (through pull-
ing the door handle, for example) until a challenge is sent which is present in the 
dictionary, after which the corresponding response can be transmitted to unlock 
the vehicle. 
 
  
In order to mitigate dictionary attacks, the key fob should halt challenge generation 
in the absence of valid responses as described above. Additionally, some form of 
sender verification should take place in the key fob. One such scenario [24] in-
volves the vehicle adding an ID to every challenge, one part of the ID transmitted 
in plaintext and the other concatenated with the challenge and encrypted. The key 
fob would then compare the plaintext ID against a copy in its own memory and, if 
it’s a match, decrypt the rest of the message. If the second part of the ID in the de-
crypted message matches the one in key fob memory it would re-encrypt the chal-
lenge using a different shared key and send it back to the vehicle as the response. 
 
6. Jamming attack: A relatively well-known attack which has been utilized in real-
world thefts [33] involves an attacker using a radio jammer. In the simplest sce-
nario, an attacker would send out a (stronger) jamming signal at the same fre-
quency as the targeted key fob. As such, when the target instructs their key fob to 
lock their car, the signal isn’t received by the vehicle and as such it isn’t locked. 
An attack like this, however, requires the target to pay no attention to the common 
visual (lights flashing) and auditory (horn beeping) confirmation signals most 
modern cars send out when being locked. A more sophisticated attack [34] would 
involve combining a jamming attack with a replay attack to utilize against rolling 
code schemes. In such a scenario, an attacker would jam the first attempt of the 
target to close their doors while intercepting the transmitted code. A second at-
tempt to close the doors would be jammed as well, with the second code being in-
tercepted again. Immediately after jamming the second closing attempt, the first 
intercepted code would be replayed against the vehicle, thus closing the doors and 
ensuring visual and auditory confirmation to the target. When the target leaves, 
the attacker can then use the intercepted second code in combination with a modi-
fied message to open the doors. Such an attack is rather delicate though since a 
single valid rolling code ‘getting through’ would invalidate all previously cap-
tured ‘queuing’ codes. 
 
One way to mitigate such combined jamming and relay attacks would be to 
properly implement cryptographic nonces. Since such a nonce is used only once, 
the captured session and its associated nonce wouldn’t correspond to the current 
session/nonce pair anymore upon the attacker’s attempt to open the car. [35] 
 
7. Cryptographic and side-channel attacks: In addition to the aforementioned at-
tacks, it is also possible for an attacker to exploit weaknesses in the cryptographic 
algorithms (and their implementation) used in the communication protocols. Since 
protocol specifications and implementation details vary from vendor to vendor it 
is impossible to provide a generic oversight of all attacks of this type and as such 
we will focus on KeeLoq[36]. Developed in the mid ‘80s, it used to be the most 
commonly used algorithm for use in RKE systems and supports both rolling code 
(for RKE) and challenge-response (for immobilizer) modes. KeeLoq provides a 
straightforward rolling code scheme, with the addition of including a static shared 
discriminant value and function value specifying the task to be executed (open, 
  
lock, etc.) in each transmitted code as well as the sequence counter. The discrimi-
nant serves to identify the transponder to the receiver upon decryption. The 
KeeLoq cipher is a Non-linear Feedback Shift Register-based block cipher with a 
32-bit block size, 64-bit key size and 528 rounds. The Original Equipment Manu-
facturer gets assigned a manufacturer key km which is stored in all its receivers. 
When a new transponder is created, a key derivation function f is called where 
unique device key kdev = f(ID, km). Derivation can be as simple as a XOR function 
or decryption using key km to ensure irreversibility, even when kdev and ID are 
known. In addition, some implementations combine the ID with a random shared 
(32, 48 or 60 bit) seed before derivation. Receivers learn transponder keys by 
transponder transmission of the ID (keys are never sent in clear) after which the 
receiver performs key derivation and stores ID and kdev. Since KeeLoq’s wide-
spread adoption for RKE purposes between 1995 and 2006 [37] various crypto-
graphic attacks have been published [38, 39, 40, 41, 42], with various levels of 
practical applicability: 
 
Table 1. KeeLoq cryptanalytical attack overview [28]. 
 
The best cryptanalytical attack to date [28] is a combined slide and meet-in-the-
middle attack possible largely due to the fact that KeeLoq’s cipher consists sol-
emnly of a multi-round application of the same function F weak against a known-
plaintext attack. The attack targets the challenge-response mode of KeeLoq (also 
referred to as Identify-Friend-or-Foe mode) and requires 216 known plaintexts 
from one transponder (requiring 65 minutes to obtain this data) and 7.8 days of 
calculations on 64 CPU cores. A variant of the attack, requiring 216 chosen 
plaintexts, takes 3.4 days of calculations on 64 CPU cores. This attack targets the 
challenge-response mode (and not the rolling code mode, which was the dominant 
commercial application) since challenges are not authenticated and as such an at-
tacker can obtain as many chosen plaintexts as necessary within a reasonable 
timeframe, while in rolling code mode the attacker only has access to the cipher-
texts. However, this only allows for simple transponder cloning. Only in the case 
  
where a weak key derivation method is used is it possible to obtain the manufac-
turer key required to generate keys for a new transponder. While the aforemen-
tioned cryptanalytic attacks show the inherent weakness of the KeeLoq design, 
they long proved impractical in real-world applications and were overshadowed 
by the fact that far faster brute force attacks (recovering keys derived from 48-bit 
seeds in under 6 hours) using dedicated hardware existed [43]. Mitigation of such 
cryptanalytic attacks would involve the adoption of strong cryptographic algo-
rithms, such as AES [44]. 
 
However, with the discovery of the first differential power analysis (DPA) attack 
on KeeLoq [45], the situation changed. The DPA attack in question (targeting var-
iations in power consumption related to the cipher’s state register) presented a 
complete break of KeeLoq and enabled an attacker to extract both the manufac-
turer key present in the receiver (which implements the cipher in software) and 
the device key present in the transponder (implementing the cipher in hardware) 
by performing DPA on captured power traces. In contrast to the cryptanalytic at-
tacks discussed above, this side-channel attack is applicable to both challenge-
response and rolling code modes. The practical results of the paper meant that an 
attacker, requiring only two intercepted messages, could clone any transponder in 
a manner of minutes (from 5-30 power traces) and allowed the attacker with ac-
cess to a receiver to recover the manufacturer key and generate new transponders 
at will. Recovering the manufacturer key from the receiver, however, proved to be 
more complicated and time consuming (requiring ~10000 traces, taking hours), 
meaning that attackers would potentially have to outsource this part to criminal 
cryptographers. The attack works for all key derivation schemes, instantly in the 
case of a weak scheme or within reasonable time using dedicated hardware in the 
case of a stronger scheme. While the authors of the paper initially suggest a suffi-
ciently random 60-bit seed as mitigation, research into cost-optimized dedicated 
hardware [46] has shown that even such an implementation could be broken with-
in a reasonable amount of time given adequate investment (as the attack is fully 
parallelizable). Further improvements upon the attack [47] allowed an attacker to 
extract the manufacturer key with a single measurement using Simple Power 
Analysis (SPA), thus greatly reducing the complexity and increasing the efficien-
cy of the attack. The SPA attack was possible due to the software implementation 
present in the receiver consuming a constant amount of clock cycles for every op-
eration except the NLF lookup table, making execution time vary for different ci-
pher texts and leaving it vulnerable to SPA. It is noted that while countermeasures 
might be undertaken to mitigate SPA and DPA (such as constant run times), other 
types of physical attacks such as fault injection might pose another future threat in 
addition to the fact that the current non-constant run times also render the imple-
mentation potentially vulnerable to timing attacks. 
  
2.2 Immobilizers 
Immobilizer systems almost always use a challenge-response protocol for message 
transmission and authentication between vehicle and key fob. Since the difference 
between immobilizer security systems and RKE systems is mostly a question of im-
plementation (in that transmission distance is far shorter, usually requires physical 
key presence in the mechanical lock and operates in challenge-response mode), some 
of the security mechanisms and associated attacks that apply to RKE systems apply to 
immobilizers as well, albeit with certain variations. For the sake of brevity we will not 
reiterate the attack categories described in 2.1, as they apply to immobilizer security 
as well, but merely highlight the differences before discussing attacks specific to im-
mobilizer security systems. A key difference separating attacks targeting immobilizer 
systems from attacks aimed at RKE systems lies in the fact that immobilizer commu-
nication only occurs within a certain small ‘safe’ radius around the immobilizer re-
ceiver. This radius is usually limited to a few centimeters in the case of immobilizers 
that require mechanical key presence before activation and a few meters (generally 
the ‘inside’ of the car) in case of ‘smart key’ immobilizers. As such, a prerequisite for 
attacks on immobilizer systems is access to the car interior, requiring an attacker to 
force their way in either physically (eg. smashing a window) or bypassing RKE secu-
rity. This difference does not, however, make MITM- or dictionary attacks any less 
feasible as construction of the dictionary can still take place (though they are rather 
inefficient for most implementations [48]) with close proximity to the key fob (which 
responds to the challenges initiated by the vehicle) and both attacks can be executed 
given that entry to the vehicle is obtained. In addition, certain immobilizer implemen-
tations [49] allow for retransmission of the last response the vehicle sent out, allowing 
the attacker to use the extra time for the repeated message to get the original response 
and relay it to the vehicle, hence circumventing distance-bounding countermeasures. 
Generally speaking all scenarios that apply to challenge-response protocols mentioned 
in 2.1 apply to immobilizer systems as well, sometimes under condition of proximity, 
except for jamming attacks as those were aimed specifically at preventing the closing 
of car doors. 
 
One real-world type of attack [50,51,52], specifically aimed at immobilizer systems 
and largely targeting BMWs, involved attackers obtaining access to the vehicle (usu-
ally through a crude jamming attack) and plugging in a diagnostic tool (produced for 
garages and widely available on the market) into the vehicle’s On-Board Diagnostics 
(OBD) port to retrieve the immobilizer key so that a cloned transponder could be 
fabricated later on. A covert GPS tracker would be installed so the car could be stolen 
with the cloned transponder at an opportune moment. Such attacks are possible be-
cause access to the OBD port is unauthenticated and because manufacturers rarely 
secure access to the OBD port [53], which has spawned various after-market solutions 
aimed at providing some form of access control to the OBD port, such as keypad-
protected covers. In addition to facilitating car theft through allowing attackers to 
bypass immobilizer systems, the plethora of security problems surrounding OBD [54] 
  
have opened up a pandora’s box [55] of additional threats which fall outside the scope 
of this paper. 
 
In order to illustrate the problems surrounding immobilizer security, we will proceed 
to discuss the publicized developments in attacks on the three technologies that domi-
nate the immobilizer market [56]: 
1. DST: Texas Instruments’ Digital Signature Transponder (DST) [48] is a crypto-
graphically enabled RFID transponder developed in 1995 and is used for immobi-
lizer authentication purposes as well as (formerly) for the Exxon-Mobil Speedpass 
payment system. The DST scheme follows the usual immobilizer setup with a 
passive transponder and a challenge-response protocol using a proprietary block 
cipher. The first version of DST that was rolled out, known as DST-40, is a block 
cipher that used a 40-bit key to produce a 40-bit ciphertext which was truncated to 
a 24-bit response to the 40-bit challenge supplied by the vehicle. In 2005, a group 
of researchers at the Johns Hopkins University [26] reverse-engineered the until-
then undisclosed cipher, performed a brute-force attack and managed to recover 
the key for use in transponder cloning. The researchers programmed a series of 
FPGAs to execute a brute-force attack on the basis of known challenge-response 
pairs, recovering a key from two pairs in roughly 11 hours using a single FPGA 
and in less than an hour when using 16 FPGAs. In addition, they used an FPGA to 
compute a series of pre-computed look-up tables reducing the cracking time to 
seconds.  
 
In order to clone a transponder an attacker would have to obtain two challenge-
response pairs from the target transponder in order to derive the key. One scenario 
would involve an active attack where the attacker sends out a chosen challenge to 
the target transponder and capture the response. Since a DST responds to as many 
as eight queries per second this phase can be accomplished fast enough to ensure 
that even brief physical proximity (a prerequisite in the case of immobilizer sys-
tems) of the attacker to the target and their transponder key is enough. Since the 
attacker can choose their challenge, they can pre-compute the associated look-up 
tables to drastically reduce the time required to recover the key. This would allow 
an attacker to create a small self-contained cloning device, containing pre-
computed lookup tables, which automatically clones any transponder key near to 
it upon activation. Another scenario would involve a passive attack where an at-
tacker uses eaves-dropping equipment (with a reported maximum distance of a 
few meters) to intercept legitimate communications between vehicle and tran-
sponder and perform an FPGA-supported brute-force attack later on. This weak-
ness is due to the short key length of the DST-40 cipher though it is claimed that 
cryptanalytic attacks against the slightly (but still insufficiently) stronger variant 
DST-80 are possible as well [57], although no sources could be found to confirm 
that claim. In order to mitigate such attacks on DSTs (short of recalling all tran-
sponders and increasing the key length) it is possible to use RFID shielding 
pouches or wallets [31] or use a so-called RSA blocker tag [58], which responds 
  
positively to all unauthorized requests, hence interfering with the attacker’s com-
munication with the target transponder. 
 
2. Hitag: Philips/NXP’s Hitag [14] has several variants used primarily in RFID tran-
sponder systems for immobilizer and RKE purposes (especially as a backup 
mechanism upon smart key power depletion). Introduced in 1996, the Hitag2 var-
iant of Hitag is one of the most widely used transponder systems in the world. 
Hitag supports three modes of operations: 
 
(i) Public: Where the contents of the transponder memory are simply broad-
cast in plaintext upon power up. 
 
(ii) Password: Receiver and transponder authenticate each other by exchanging 
their passwords which, however, is transmitted in the clear and hence vul-
nerable to replay attacks.  
 
(iii) Crypto: In this mode, which is the one used for immobilizer systems, Hitag 
receiver and transponder share a common secret key. At the start of each 
session, the vehicle’s receiver sends a command to the transponder which 
replies with its serial number. To mitigate replay attacks, an Initialization 
Vector (IV) is generated for each session using the secret key, IV and tag 
serial number for initialization of the proprietary Hitag stream cipher. After 
initialization Hitag produces a keystream where the first 32-bits are used as 
an authenticator and the remaining 32-bits are used for encryption. The re-
ceiver then sends the 32-bit IV and 32-bit authenticator to the transponder. 
The transponder calculates the authenticator as well and, if they match, re-
sponds by encrypting (using a proprietary stream cipher) its configuration 
data and password (used as a fallback mechanism in case the cryptosystem 
is broken) using the rest of the key and sends this to the receiver. The dif-
ference between Hitag1 and Hitag2 lies mainly in the fact that Hitag2 uses 
a 48-bit secret key as opposed to Hitag1’s 32-bit. Since the receiver is au-
thenticated first, this prevents tag-only attacks (eg. replay attacks or stand-
ard dictionary attacks) and requires an attacker to obtain sniffed data first.  
 
Since Hitag1 relies on a mere 32-bit secret key, a brute-force attack is reported to 
be feasible within the order of mere minutes [56,57]. Research [59] has also 
shown that Hitag1 and Hitag2 are vulnerable to modified dictionary attacks. Since 
Hitag supports authenticated challenge-response sessions, a so-called Three-step 
dictionary attack first gathers a series of challenges with a valid authenticator by 
triggering the receiver and before initiating a regular dictionary attack. Hitag’s 
vulnerability to such an attack could be mitigated by implementing additional 
countermeasures. For example, the number of successive unsuccessful authentica-
tion sessions on the receiver could be limited (with a timeout for example) as well 
as limiting the number of authentication sessions on the transponder side. A more 
general mitigation would involve improving the size of the challenge-response 
  
pair space or the amount of time it takes for a session to complete in order to in-
crease the complexity of dictionary attacks to the point of infeasibility. 
 
With the market prominence of Hitag2, follow-up attacks have been developed 
targeting various aspects of its design and implementation: 
 
Attack Description Practical Computation Traces Time 
[64] 
Brute-force Yes 2102400 min 2 4 years 
[60] 
Sat-solver Yes 2880 min 4 2 days 
[65] 
Brute-force Yes 660 min 2 11 hrs 
[62] 
Sat-solver No 386 min N/A N/A 
[64] 
Brute-force Yes 103.5 min 2 2 hrs 
[14] 
Cryptanalytic Yes 5 min 136 6 min 
[63] 
Cube No 1 min 500 N/A 
Table 2. Attacks against Hitag2 (partially based on [14]) 
Initial research [60] focused on cryptanalytic attacks against the Hitag2 cipher 
which showed that reducing the cipher to a series of multivariate quadratic equa-
tions and solving it using a SAT-solver [61] is possible given that the algorithm is 
very linear (eg. output isn’t filtered back into the state) and doesn’t have too many 
rounds. The attack uses the fact that 32 bits of the key stream are known per IV to 
mount a known IV attack that takes a little under 2 days on a full 48-bit key (a 
chosen IV attack taking only 6 hours is possible against the cipher in general but 
not against its application in the described protocol. Similarly, a SAT-solver op-
timization was described [62] making an attack taking under 7 hours possible 
which, however, required 50 bits of contiguous key stream making it theoretical). 
The second cryptanalytic attack developed against Hitag2 concerned a so-called 
cube attack [63] taking only a minute on your average PC. However, since cube 
attacks are chosen IV attacks, the actual protocol implementation of Hitag2 makes 
this attack strictly theoretical. In order to mitigate such attacks, cipher security (as 
well as key size) should be increased, preferably by using publicly reviewed 
strong cryptography. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned cryptanalytic attacks, Hitag2 has also been the 
target of brute-force attacks. Such an attack [64] involved sniffing a single session 
between vehicle and transponder to obtain the transponder serial number, the IV 
and the authenticator before generating and testing all possible 248 keys. Every 
key is passed through Hitag2 and the resulting authenticator is compared to the 
captured authenticator, a match resulting in the key becoming a candidate. In or-
  
der to find the correct candidate, all candidates are checked against a second 
sniffed session (which has a different IV and authenticator). The matching candi-
date is the recovered secret key. Brute-force performance on a regular Pentium-IV 
processor would take 4 years and as such is impractical but a dedicated FPGA-
based platform (a so-called COPACOBANA) yielded far better results, recover-
ing the key in less than two hours. Since such hardware is fairly expensive, an at-
tack running on off-the-shelf hardware [65] using OpenCL across CPUs and 
GPUs was developed capable of key recover in less than 11 hours on a budget of 
€5,000. 
 
Finally, a paper published in 2012 [14] revealed a whole host of other weaknesses 
in and practical attacks against Hitag2. The core weaknesses revealed by the paper 
are as follows: 
 
(i) Arbitrary length key stream oracle: It is possible for an attacker, without 
knowing the secret key and with only a single intercepted authentication at-
tempt, to obtain an arbitrary length of key stream from the transponder. 
Hitag2 transponders offer the possibility to extend the length of any com-
mand with a multiple of five bits (up to a total message length of 5010 bits) 
using redundancy messages. Since the receiver is not authenticated to the 
transponder (the transponder lacks a PRNG), it is possible to replay any 
valid nonce & authenticator pair to the transponder. The transponder will 
only respond when the received message is decrypted correctly. By replay-
ing the intercepted pair and gradually extending the length with redundancy 
messages (5 bits at a time), the attacker only has to brute-force 32-bits per 
replay to obtain the corresponding key stream.  
 
(ii) Dependencies between sessions: At a specific state the cipher is fully ini-
tialized and from there on only produces key streams. This reveals that the 
48-bit cipher internal state is randomized by a nonce of only 32 bits, as 
such, at that specific state, only the upper half of the LFSR are affected by 
the nonce, the lower half remaining constant, causing strong dependency 
throughout sessions as these 16 persistent bits correspond to bits k0..k15 of 
the secret key.  
 
(iii) Low degree determination of the filter function: Due to a weakness in the 
cipher design (4 filtered bits cover 14 bits of the internal state) there’s a 
chance of 1 in 4 that an output bit of the cipher is determined by only 34 
out of 48 bits of the internal state. Consequentially 1/4th (on average) of all 
authentication attempts leaks one bit of secret key information. 
 
These weaknesses can be exploited in the following attack scenarios: 
 
(i) Malleability attack: In this attack the lack of a PRNG or challenge to the 
receiver on part of the transponder is exploited by having an attacker inter-
  
cept a valid authentication attempt. Exploiting the key stream oracle weak-
ness, the attacker can read known plaintext and recover the key stream. 
Subsequently the attacker can then use the key stream to read any other 
memory block including the secret key. If properly configured, however, 
the secret key cannot be read by the transponder, though most implementa-
tions appear to be incorrectly configured.  
 
(ii) Time/memory tradeoff attack: A second attack (slower but generally appli-
cable to LSFR-based stream ciphers) relies on a time/memory tradeoff to 
generate a lookup table (of roughly 1.2TB, a process which takes less than 
a day) of 237 cipher state/key stream pairs. The attacker then emulates a 
transponder to obtain a nonce-authenticator pair and replays it to the target 
transponder exploiting the key stream oracle to obtain 256 bytes of contig-
uous key stream. The attacker then iterates through the obtained key stream 
in blocks of 48-bits and looks them up in the table. If a match is found, it is 
recorded as a candidate internal state. The rest of the key stream is used to 
verify the internal state. Using the obtained internal state, the attacker per-
forms a rollback of the cipher to obtain the secret key. Total attack time is 
roughly one minute (30 seconds to gather 256 bytes of key stream from the 
transponder and worst case 30 seconds to perform the lookup). 
 
(iii) Cryptanalytic attack: The third and most powerful attack requires only 136  
authentication attempts from the vehicle (gathered by the attacker emulat-
ing a transponder) in order to recover the secret key (given that the attack-
ers knows a valid transponder serial number). The attacker guesses the first 
34 key bits and performs a check on the authenticator (using the low de-
termination flaw) to eliminate non-candidate keys. The session dependency 
flaw allows the attacker to perform this test many times (136/4 = 34 bits), 
increasing the efficiency of non-candidate key elimination. For the few 
candidate keys that pass these tests (~2-3) an exhaustive search for the re-
maining 14 bits is performed. The entire attack can be performed in 360 
seconds. 
 
In addition to the above design flaws, the paper also mentions that a lot of vendors 
make serious implementation mistakes, reducing security even further. The im-
plementation errors encountered were: default or predictable transponder pass-
words, usage in keyless ignition systems which bypass the need for a physical key 
being inserted, weak PRNGs on the side of the vehicle (sometimes resulting in 
nonces with an entropy of as little as 8 bits), secret keys with repetitive patterns, 
poorly configured transponders (eg. without a set protection bit and thus readable 
secret keys). All tested cars did however have transponder serial number white 
listing and as such an attacker would have to obtain one from the target tran-
sponder first before executing an attack. In order to mitigate such attacks migra-
tion to a cryptographically secure cipher would be recommended as well as ex-
tending the transponder password and introducing communication delay after au-
  
thentication failure. In addition, using CSPRNGs and introducing transponder au-
thentication to the protocol would also improve overall security. NXP’s Hitag 
AES solution already implements the (as of writing) cryptographically secure 
AES, though the associated protocol is proprietary and as such nothing can be 
said about the level of security it offers. 
 
3. Megamos: EM’s Megamos is another immobilizer system with a significant mar-
ket share. Recently, research [27] seemed to indicate that Megamos was vulnera-
ble to attacks comparable to those against Hitag2 with a similar level of practicali-
ty. Apparently[66], the researchers did not reverse engineer a Megamos im-
moblizer system itself but a piece of 3rd party software implementing a transpond-
er programmer. The researchers managed to identify 3 weaknesses: weak secret 
keys (even though it is claimed [67] that the cipher used in Megamos relies on a 
96-bit secret key), poor key updating and a cryptanalytical attack. However, due 
to a temporary judicial injunction, publication of both the paper and presentation 
have been prohibited and as such the nature of the weaknesses remains publicly 
unavailable. One presentation [56], however, superficially mentions at least one 
vulnerability in the Megamos protocol (which was ironically described rather 
clearly in the court injunction itself) due to an insecure challenge-response proto-
col where the transponder doesn’t authenticate itself to the vehicle. 
2.3 The big picture 
In conclusion, the security problems associated with both RKE and immobilizer 
systems come down to the following three points (though specifically discussing im-
mobilizers, they’re equally applicable to RKE systems) [57]: 
(i) Legacy: Phasing out immobilizers seems to take years (eg. DST-40 was 
broken in 2005 and phased out only towards 2011). Even after certain sys-
tems have been broken, manufacturers have continued to use them for long 
periods of time, something which shouldn’t be the case. 
 
(ii) Proprietary and weak cryptography: All discussed immobilizer systems 
use proprietary cryptographic algorithms which are often very weak and 
have gone without public scrutiny or serious cryptanalysis before being 
rolled out. Memory and power consumption limitations on RFID devices 
imposes certain limitations on cryptographic functionality but the existence 
of devices implementing strong cryptographic algorithms (such as AES) 
shows reliance upon weak and proprietary cryptography is unnecessary. 
While this tendency toward violating Kerckhoff’s principle is widespread, 
something is to be said for not disclosing implemented algorithms since 
knowledge of the used algorithm eases the task of attackers looking for po-
tential side channel-based weaknesses and mitigating side-channel attacks 
is costly. Security through obscurity doesn’t work but obscurity in addition 
to security does complicate (especially in terms of investment of resources 
  
and effort) an attacker’s job. Nevertheless, migration to strong ciphers 
(whether proprietary or public) is eventually necessary. 
 
(iii) Implementation faults: In addition to (ii) implementation faults further low-
er immobilizer security, often reducing the complexity of certain attacks or 
even undoing any security features altogether. Thorough application of 
‘best practices’ and security analysis of developed or integrated systems 
ought to be standard practice. 
Considering the spread of “car digitalization” and the expansion of the attack surface 
this presents [55], Karsten Nohl notes [56] this leaves manufacturers with two op-
tions: a) keep cars simple and hence the attack surface limited and controlled b) 
strongly invest in serious security to eliminate design and implementation flaws, 
while phasing out broken systems fast. 
3 Privacy 
In stark contrast to security-related issues there has been almost no public discussion 
about or research regarding the privacy aspects of RFID-based car keys. While there 
has been plenty of research regarding RFID privacy issues in general [68,69,73] and 
some discussion about RFID privacy issues surrounding cars in particular [70], nei-
ther RKE or immobilizer applications seem to be of much privacy-related interest. As 
such, this lack of public attention towards and research regarding the privacy aspects 
of RFID car keys means this overview (which does not include original research) will 
be limited in this regard. Apart from the obvious risks to general privacy posed by the 
insecurity of RFID car key applications it is also worth mentioning that at least one 
aspect of such systems falls under the broad umbrella of ‘privacy concerns’ proper. 
Since virtually all transponders send out their unique serial number at some point 
during a communication session, this constitutes a piece of ‘personal information’. 
California legislation [71], for example, defines personal information to be, among 
other things, “any unique personal identifier”. Even though such serial numbers have 
no meaning by themselves, they derive their meaning from their relationship to the 
person carrying them and their uniqueness makes it possible to both couple a vehicle 
and its related information to a person, as well as track said person’s movement pat-
terns as Bruce Schneier [72] remarks. While privacy risks are somewhat reduced by 
the fact that transponders operate at relatively short ranges, a scenario involving tar-
geted individual attacks (eg. following or approaching someone closely in order to 
query their transponder for information) or ‘turnstile-style’ funneling of personal 
movements combined with automated querying isn’t far-fetched. Despite approaches 
suggested to mitigate privacy risks associated with RFID [73], car keys haven’t been 
the subject of research into this area. In conclusion, the privacy aspects of RFID-
enabled car keys seem woefully under-investigated and would benefit from research 
in that direction. Judging from the little information that is available, relying on RF 
shielded pouches seems to be the most reliable privacy measure overall. 
  
4 Conclusion 
As we can see, RFID-based car key applications (whether as RKE or immobilizer 
systems) have historically shown a woeful lack of adequate security levels, being 
vulnerable to a plethora of attacks resulting from a mix of flawed protocol designs 
and the usage of weak cryptography, with often a host of additional implementation 
faults on top. And while recently RFID car key implementations with a more serious 
level of security have been surfacing on the market so far these don’t seem to have 
been rolled out on a grand scale. Considering the relatively low cost of manufacturing 
(after initial research investment) car key systems with a more adequate level of secu-
rity (given advances in implementing strong cryptography for RFID applications) 
compared to the price of certain high-end car models, it seems paramount that the 
automotive industry take steps to ensure vehicle security for their consumers. In this 
respect, it is imperative to deal with the three issues mentioned in section 2.3: a) lega-
cy problems b) weak and proprietary cryptography c) implementation faults. 
 
Regarding matters of privacy, it is recommended that research be undertaken to inves-
tigate the privacy risks associated with RFID-based car key applications to fill the 
current gap in that area. In the meantime, the best option for concerned car owners 
seems to be the use of shielded pouches. 
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